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1. Introduction
Although the regulatory reform of the Japanese telecommunications industry was slow 
in comparison with those of the U.S.A and the U.K., it has been gradually catching up 
with them after the dispute between NTT and the government over the reforms. At 
present, competition is emerging even in the local call market, which was effectively a 
NTT monopoly for a long period, with extensive restructuring and deregulation. 
However, the new entry in the local telephone market is limited only in the heavily 
populated urban center, and the `digital divide' of the high-speed and broadband 
services such as xDSL and FTTH between urban areas and rural areas is becoming a 
new political problem.
This paper will estimate the long-run translog cost function of multiple services, based 
on Palmer's method, measure the stand-alone costs and the incremental costs, and thus 
calculate the different costs in each region of the Japanese local telecommunications. 
The main conclusions can be summarized as follows. When the average stand-alone 
costs and the average incremental costs of the telephone service and the leased circuit 
service are compared between the eleven NTT's regional offices, the cost gap of the 
leased circuit service is larger than that of the telephone service. It seems from what 
has been stated that the problem of regional gap is serious not in the conventional 
service that has spread very widely but in the newly developing service in which the 
multiplexing of the network plays an important role such as high-speed and broadband
-2-
iservices. 
The paper consists of the following eight sections. Section 2 briefly surveys the 
Japanese universal service policy, Section 3 explains the method of the cost estimation, 
and Section 4 represents he result of the estimation. Section 5 provides the definitions 
of stand-alone costs and incremental costs, whilst Section 6 analyzes the calculated 
costs from both viewpoints of cross-section a d time-series. Section 7 examines the 
implications for the telecommunications policy, and finally Section 8 draws a 
conclusion. 
2. An overview of the Japanese universal service policy 
It will be helpful to survey the Japanese universal service policy before moving on to 
the main subject'. The object of the present universal service of Japan, like many other 
countries, is the fixed-line telephone service whose nationwide development had 
already been completed by 1985, when Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) was 
privatized and the telecommunications market was liberalized. While the argument in
1 See Bohlin (1997), Hayashi and Fuke (2000), and Tsuji (2000) for the comprehensive description 
with regard to the regulatory reform in Japan's telecommunications. Empirical studies such as 
Nakajima and Hatta (1993), Tachibanaki nd Irie (1994), Oniki, et al. (1994) and Sueyoshi (1996) 
are also informative. 
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favor of universal service were hardly put forward at all at the introduction of 
competition, only NTT was determined to impose the universal service obligation 
because in the past it had this characteristic as a public corporation. However, it 
should be noted that this obligation was a sort of expected duty written in NTT 
Corporation Law but this obligation on NTT was not clearly stated in the 
Telecommunications Business Law. 
The question of why the prescription of the Japanese universal service was ambiguous 
may arise. It will be necessary to explain the long debate concerning the management 
structure of NTT in order to understand this. After the privatization of NTT in 1985 
and the new entry of New Common Carriers (NCCs) in 1987, the main issue that 
needed to be dealt with in the area of competition policy was how to ensure the 
conditions for fair and effective competition between NTT, which was a bottleneck 
monopoly in the local call market, and the long-distance NCCs, which did not hold the 
local loop. Although the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) considered 
the reorganization of the management s ructure of NTT, including its divesture, in 1990, 
a consensus could not be reached and the issue was postponed for five years.
In the meantime, NTT divided itself into a long-distance operation division and the 
eleven regional offices in 1992 and introduced an accounting separation among them; 
furthermore, NTT reached agreement with the long-distance NCCs, such as DDI, JT, 
and TWJ, to introduce an access charge based on an end-to-end tariff system. NTT 












also announced the open network policy, which represented NTT's spontaneous 
nondiscriminatory interconnection scheme. However, since NTT continued to be a 
substantial monopoly in the local call market in spite of such a series of reforms, the 
conflicts between NTT and NCCs with respect o interconnection occasionally occurred. 
Finally, in 1996, MPT and NTT agreed on the reorganization of NTT under a new 
holding company scheme: NTT would be reorganized into one long-distance company 
(NTT-Communication) and two regional companies (East NTT and West NTT) under 
the ownership of the holding company which would also inherit the NTT's R&D . In 
1999, the new NTT group was established. After the problem of the management 
structure of NTT was solved in this way, the regulatory reform in the Japanese 
telecommunications industry itself began to make rapid progress'. 
More than fifteen years have passed since liberalization and privatization were carried 
out: at present, the local NCCs such as subsidiaries of electric power companies and 
Z Specifically, after the reorganization f NTT, the following regulatory eforms have been carried 
out. First, the charge regulation was reformed so that he long-distance and international services 
could be priced completely freely while the local call service was regulated with a price cap instead 
of the previous rate-of-return regulation from 2000. Second, as for the reform of access charge, the 
long-run incremental cost rule was adopted from 2000, and furthermore NTT promised to reduce the 
level of charge by 20% within two years. Third, as for the problem of equal access, the dialing 
parity system was introduced from 2001 and also a number portability would start after that. 
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CATV companies have entered into the local call market, and a competition has started 
to emerge even there. Accordingly, it is not becoming reasonable to impose the 
universal service obligation on only East and West NTT from the viewpoint of level-
playing-field because other local call companies tend to behave in an opportunistic way. 
Due to such recognition, when the telecommunications Business Law was revised in 
2001, the plan was announced for a new external subsidiary system that should be 
competitively neutral. While the specific design of a universal service fund is a matter 
under consideration, this paper intends to present a basis for the policy discussion3. 
3. The method of the estimation of cost function
In this section, the method of estimation will be explained. We assume here a cost
3 One effective approach toward the universal service policy is the method of calculating long-run 
incremental cost based on the engineering cost model. This approach deserves more than passing 
attention. However, this has two shortcomings. First, an incumbent firm may fail to recover the 
embedded cost of the past investment for plant-and-equipment i  he case where technical progress 
has been remarkable, since the plant-and-equipment that used to be the most efficient technology 
becomes inefficient at the time of the cost calculation. Second, the current Japanese universal 
service policy covers only the plain old telephone service (POTS). Nevertheless, ince the actual 
telephone companies jointly produce several services other than POTS, it is necessary to take 
account of the joint cost of offering multiple products. 
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function that consists of three inputs of labor force, raw material, and capital and two 
outputs of telephone and leased circuit as follows: 
       C= C (PL, PM, PK, Y11 Y2, t), (1) 
            given L=labor, M= material, K=capital, 
             Y1=telephone, Y2=leased circuit, and t=time trend. 
Furthermore, we suppose the cost function to be a translog cost function, which is 
known as a type of flexible cost function. One purpose of this paper is to measure 
stand-alone costs and incremental costs. For that, since we need to insert the value of 
zero into the cost function, we cannot directly measure stand-alone costs and 
incremental costs with the translog cost function. We may utilize the generalized 
translog cost function that carries out Box-Cox transformation or the symmetrically 
generalized McFadden cost function so that we can insert zero into the cost function. 
Asai (2001) previously estimated the generalized translog cost function with Box-Cox 
transformation i  order to measure stand-alone costs and incremental costs, although the 
problem of multi-collinearity was pointed out since the Box-Cox transformed quantities 
showed a high degree of correlation (note: the correlation coefficient was 0.915). 
Whereas the adoption of the cost function of McFadden's type is a future subject 
worthy of consideration, it should be noted that Roller (1990) pointed out the non-
robustness around the domain of zero when the generalized functional form is assumed. 
4 See also Pulley and Braustein (1992), Mackenzie (1997), Toft and B jorndal (1997) for further 
methods. They assumed a linear function i stead of a logarithmic function for outputs. 
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Thus, based on Palmer's method (see Palmer 1991, 1992), we will measure stand-alone 
costs and incremental costs without directly inserting zero into the translog cost 
function. The translog cost function is defined as follows: 
     In C = ao + ja i lnP + 1 1 1 fiij lnPi In Pj 
                          i- L,M,K 2 i-L,M ,K j- L,M,K 
           + 2 yi InYi + 1 1 j bij In Y In Y + pij In Pi In Yj (2) 
                           i-1,2 2 i-1,2j-1,2 i-L,M,K j-1,2 
            + ~AilnPit+ ~OilnYit+xtt+ 1 rut2+gD1nY2. 
                           i-L, MX i-1,2 2 
Three inputs prices are defined as follows: 
      PL: the labor price = the personnel expenses / the number of employees at the 
             end of the fiscal years, 
      PM: the material price = the non-personnel expenses / the number of telephone 
             subscriptions at the end of the fiscal year, 
      PK: the capital price = the price index of the capital goods x (the interest rate of 
             the government guaranteed bonds + the rate of depreciation)6, 
      given the rate of depreciation = the depreciation expenses / the equipment 
5The data re extracted from Statement of Income and Financial Report of NTT on each fiscal year. 
6See Monthly Price Index Report by Bank of Japan about he price index of the capital goods and 
Monthly Economic Statistics Report by Bank of Japan about he interest rate of the government 
guaranteed bonds. 
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1 
y
i             expenses at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Also two outputs are defined as follows: 
      Y,: the total minutes of telephone call, 
      Y2: the total number of leased circuits'. 
Since the scale of market and the density of demand vary across regional offices, we 
adopt the dummy variables (D=1) for the output of leased circuit of Tokyo, Kanto, 
Tokai, and Kansai. Furthermore, we assume the following constraints of linear 
homogeneity with regard to input prices in advance: 
          ai=1, ' = p;= ~X,=0. (3) 
             is ,K 1° K 1- K r= K 
At the same time, we assume the following symmetry of second-order partial 
derivatives with regard to input prices: 
       fl; _ P,i . (4) 
From Shepherd's lemma, the share equations of inputs (i=L,M,K) are obtained as 
follows: 
        alnC _ aC P. PX                  = ` L=at+ ~jlnPi+ Ip~jlnYj+ ) t, (5) 
         a lnP a pi C C j-L,M,K j-1,2 
The total cost that is the explained variable is the sum of the personnel expenses, the 
' The total number of leased circuits i the sum of the general leased circuit and the high-speed 
digital circuit, which is transformed into the corresponding number oftelephone lines. 
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material cost, and the capital cost. The capital cost is defined as the product of the 
capital stock and the capital price, and the capital stock is defined as follows: 
      the capital stock = (1- the rate of depreciation) x the capital stock at the 
              previous term + the real gross investment, 
       given the real gross investment = the amount of annual change of the fixed 
              assets + the depreciation expenses. 
We can now estimate the simultaneous equations of the translog cost function, with the 
constraints of the linear homogeneity and the second-order symmetry, and the share 
equations of labor and material by the maximum likelihood (ML) method. The data 
are extracted from the eleven NTT's regional offices from 1992 to 19978. Fig. 1 
displays a map of the eleven NTT's regional offices for reference. Table 1 also 
presents the average outputs of the telephone service and the leased circuit service of 
each regional office each year. There are two points to note here. The first is that 
outputs of the larger regional offices, such as Tokyo, Kanto, Tokai and Kansai, which 
are operating in the metropolitan areas, such as Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka, are quite 
different from those of other smaller regional offices. The second is that the growth 
'The data of regional offices became available when the regional company system of NTT was 
introduced in 1992. However, the release of the data ended in 1997 because the reorganization f 
NTT was agreed in 1996. Therefore, there is an inconsistency in NTT's data before and after 1997. 
This is the reason the amount of data is quite limited for this analysis. 
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rate of the telephone service decreased drastically in the years after 1995 while that of 
the leased circuit service has consistently risen.
<Fig. 1> 
<Table 1>
4. The result of the estimation
This section will show the result of the estimation. A high correlation between the 
outputs of telephone and leased circuit is observed in the estimation; in particular, the 
correlation coefficients between the first-order term and the second-order term of the 
telephone service, Y1 and Y12, and the leased circuit service, Y2 and Y22, are higher than 
0.95. Thus the problem of multi-collinearity would occur. At this point, we drop the 
second-order terms in order to avoid this problem. The result of the estimation is 
displayed in Table 2.
<Table 2>
Next, we turn to investigate the properness of the functional form. Having assumed 
that the cost function is linear homogeneous with regard to input prices, it is sufficient 
that we check the conditions that the cost function, first, is non-decreasing with regard 
to input prices and output quantities and, second, is concave with regard to input prices 
                                           -11-
in order to prove the properness. These conditions are in fact satisfied for all samples. 
S. The definitions of stand-alone cost and incremental cost 
In this section, we will provide the definitions of stand-alone cost and incremental cost. 
To define stand-alone cost and incremental cost, we need to insert he value of zero into 
the cost function, but the translog cost function does not permit his. As stated before, 
we will here measure the stand-alone cost and the incremental cost on the basis of 
Palmer's method. According to this method, the stand-alone cost and the incremental 
cost can be defined as follows on condition that he economies ofscale are constant. 
The stand-alone cost of the telephone service, SAC(Y1), and the leased circuit service, 
SAC(Y2): 
      SAC(Y) MC(Y1, Y2) - Y2 OQYi 1 Y2) 'Y2-Y2 , (6)                       aY
2 
       SAC(Y2) 0 C(Y 1, Y2) - Y1 aC(Y11 Y2) I Y1 _Y1 , (7)                       aY
, 
            given that 1 represents an arbitrary value; here we will adopt the 
            average value of the i-good of each regional office from 1992 to 1997 
             as the standard value. 
The incremental cost of the telephone service, IC(Y1), and the leased circuit service, 
IC(Y2): 
  IC(Y1) _C(Y1, Y2) -SAC(Y1) (8) 






      IC(Y2) 1M C(Y 1, Y2) - SAC(Y 1). (9) 
We will explain the definitions above. Originally, since the stand-alone cost of the 
telephone service and the incremental cost of the leased circuit service are defined as 
C(Y1, 0) and C(Y1, Y2) - C(Y1, 0) respectively, we obtain the following equations: 
      SAC(Y1)=C(Y1, 0) IC(Y2)=C(Y1, Y2) - C(Y1, 0) (10) 
                          _ ?C(Y             C(Y1112) -C(Y1,0) °1,Y2) 'Y2-Y2                                Y2 aY2 
Likewise, since the stand-alone cost of the leased circuit service and the incremental 
cost of the telephone service are defined as C(0, Y2) and C(Y1, Y2) - C(0, Y2) 
respectively, we obtain the following equations: 
      SAC(Y2)=C(0, Y2) IC(Y1)=C(Y1, Y2) - C(0, Y2) (11) 
                           C(Y1,Y2)-C(0,Y2) 
                            q - o/C(Yi,Y2 )                                                                      lYl-Yl.                              Y
1 aYl 
The necessary and sufficient condition that the definitions of stand-alone cost and 
incremental cost given above are equal to these original definitions i  that the average 
incremental cost is equal to the marginal cost in the standard value, which represents he 
fact that he product-specific s ale conomies are constant. 
As a matter of fact, the product-specific s ale economies are not always constant, or 
rather they occasionally exist, in the telecommunications industry. In the case where 
the scale economies of the leases circuit service exist, we obtain the following 
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inequalities: 
      SAC(Y1)>C(Y1, 0) IC(Y2)<C(Y1, Y2) - C(Y1, 0) (12) 
                       q C(Y1, 12) - C(Y1,0) > dC(Y1, Y2) 'Y2-Y2                                                             _Y
2 dY2 
Likewise, in the case where the scale economies of the telephone service exist, we 
obtain the following inequalities: 
      SAC(Y2)>C(0, Y2) ~. IC(Y1)<C(Y1, Y2) - C(0, Y2) (13) 
                       a C(Y1,Y2)-C(0,Y2) > dC(Y1,Y2 )                                         Y 
i dy, IY, -Y, . 
That is to say, in the case where the product-specific s ale economies exist, the 
definitions given above represent both the upper limit of stand-alone cost and the lower 
limit of incremental cost9. On the other hand, in the case where the product-specific 
scale diseconomies xist, the reverse holds. 
6. The result of the analysis of the stand-alone cost and the incremental cost
6
9 Several studies have so far been carried out on the Japanese local telecommunications i dustry. 
See Asai and Nemoto (2001), Asai (2001) for example. To sum up, the economies of scale of the 
telephone service are quite small, or do not exist in the urban areas, while those of the leased circuit 
service are still large. It follows that Palmer's method appropriately represents he stand-alone cost 
of the leased circuit service and the incremental cost of the telephone service (see Eq. (11)) and, on 
the other hand, confines the upper limit of stand-alone cost of the telephone service and the lower 
limit of the incremental cost of the leased circuit service (see Eq. (12)). 
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In this section, we will analyze the result of the analysis from the viewpoints of cross-
section and time-series. Tables 3 and 4 represent the stand-alone costs and the 
incremental costs of the telephone service and the leased circuit service in 1992 and 
1997 respectively. Furthermore, Figs. 2 and 3 graphically display Tables 3 and 4. 
The observations can be summarized as followslo. 
     <Tables 3 and 4> 
      <Figs. 2 and 3> 
   Observation 1. The costs of the larger regional offices operating in the metropolitan 
        areas are lower than those of the smaller regional offices operating in the 
        rural areas with regard to both the telephone service and the leased circuit 
        service.
io The statistical significances of the costs of the telephone service are high while
, in particular, the 
incremental costs of the leased circuit service are low. One reason for this is that the first-term 
coefficient of the leased circuit service is not statistically significant. However, there are other 
reasons: first, the incremental cost is defined as the total cost minus stand-alone cost and therefore 
must be calculated with more estimates than the stand-alone cost; second, and probably foremost, the 
estimated figures of the incremental cost themselves are really small. 
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To take Table 4 for example, the average stand-alone cost and the average incremental 
cost of the telephone service of the larger regional offices (Tokyo, Kanto, Tokai, and 
Kansai) in 1997 are 108.4 and 95.7 respectively, while for the other smaller regional 
offices the figures arel39.2 and 133.5. Similarly, the average stand-alone cost and the 
average incremental cost of the leased circuit service of the larger regional offices are 
19.3 and 1.7 respectively, while for the smaller regional offices they are 22.3 and 11.3. 
   Observation 2. The cost gap of the telephone service is smaller than that of the 
        leased circuit between the eleven NTT's regional offices.
To take Table 4 for example, the coefficient of variation of the average stand-alone cost 
of the telephone service in 1997 is 0.126, while for the leased circuit service the figure 
is 0.236. Similarly, the coefficient of variation of the average incremental cost of the 
telephone service is 0.167, while for the leased circuit service it is 0.694.
Observation 3. The costs of the telephone service have not decreased while those 
    of the leased circuit service have decreased significantly.
To compare Tables 3 and 4, the rate of increase of the average stand-alone cost and the 
average incremental cost of the telephone service throughout 1992-1997 are 0.5% and 
5% respectively, while for the leased circuit service the figures are -65% and -68%. 
This seems to reflect the fact that the growth rate of the telephone service decreased in 
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the years after 1995 while that of the leased circuit service has consistently risen. 
   Observation 4. The difference between the average stand-alone cost and the 
        average incremental cost of the telephone service is smaller than that of the 
        leased circuit service. 
To take Table 4 for example, the ratio of the average incremental cost to the average 
stand-alone cost of the telephone service in 1997 is 92%, while for the leased circuit 
service it is 25%. One of the reasons for this is that since it does not need expensive 
switchboards and feeder plants for an incumbent company to additionally provide the 
leased circuit service. 
7. Some policy implications of the result of the analysis 
The number of samples for the estimation is quite limited, and some estimated variables 
are not significant. Although it is necessary to be concerned about the reliability of the 
result for this reason, the following points can be made as far as the implications for 
telecommunications policy are concerned. 
The regional gap of costs of the leased circuit service is larger than that of the telephone 
service. This reason must be investigated from not only an economic point of view but 
also a technical one. One possible reason is that the number of residential users 
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exceeds that of business users in the telephone service, while the large-volume business 
users mainly purchase the leased circuit service and therefore the regional gap of the 
demand density of the leased circuit service is quite large. In addition to this, due to 
the progress of the multiplexing technology of network, the average cost of the leased 
circuit service has been drastically decreasing. Since this paper has supposed that the 
output of leased circuit is represented as the corresponding number of telephone lines, 
which means that the capacity of the leased circuit facilities is adequately taken into 
consideration, the regional gap of the demand density of the leased circuit service leads 
to the large .inequality of the average costs. The demand for the leased circuit service 
is currently expanding nationally with the rapid spread of the Internet. It seems, 
however, that the regional gap of the demand density of the leased circuit service will 
persist at least for a while.
The Japanese government is now promoting the nationwide construction of the high-
speed and broadband network as a part of the ` Information Technology (IT) Basic 
Strategy'. It is important o note that such a high speed and broadband network is also 
using the. same multiplexing technology as adopted by the leased circuit service. 
Although there is a controversy about whether to include the high-speed and broadband 
service in the universal service policy, the analysis of this paper can be interpreted to 
show that the construction of the high-speed and broadband network will enlarge the 
different costs in each region of the next-generation service. It follows from what has 
been said that the universal service policy is still important in that the different costs in 
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G
each region continue to be a big issue towards the realization of broadband society of 
the next generation. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper, first, estimated the cost function of the Japanese local telecommunications 
and, second, calculated the stand-alone costs and the incremental costs of the telephone 
service and the leased circuit service respectively. Based on these results, we went on 
to investigate the different costs in each region. Finally, we examined the policy 
implications from our empirical result. Some problems have been left unanswered. 
First, Palmer's method just limits the range of stand-alone cost and incremental cost 
unless the product-specific e onomies of scope are constant. In this respect, what we 
did is the approximate comparison of the different costs in each region. Second, the 
purpose of this paper is to compare the cost structures between POTS and other 
advanced services. However, there are insufficient data on such new services as xDSL 
and FTTH enough to be empirically verified. Instead, we considered the leased circuit 
service as a sort of proxy of new services, but we understand the limitation of such an 
indirect approach, and therefore we have to wait for more data to be collected. We are 
fully aware of the questions tated above and consider them to be subjects for future 
research. 
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